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Legitimacy and the TRIPS Agreement
Daya Shanker
Introduction
It has been a matter of serious discussion among the international legal scholars that
without the regulatory power of the state in domestic law, so many rules of international
law are so freq uently followed by so many states. 1
Franck’s perception of legitimacy is a “perception on the part of those to whom it is
addressed that it has come into being in accordance with right process. Right process
includes the notion of valid sources but also encompasses literary, socio-anthropological
and philosophical insights.” 2
Dworkin identified three characteristics, which are conducive to the rule of law: fairness,
justice and integrity or consistency. 3 Koh4 , Keohane 5 , Weisburd 6 , Setear7 and Murphy8
have variously interpreted and applied Franck’s theory of legitimacy to various aspects of
international legal situations.
Franck discussed the concept of legitimacy starting from Max Weber to the strategic
concept of legitimacy where contracting parties for the mutualizing advantage adopt the
voluntary compliance. Weber emphasized the greater adherence of subjects to the rule of
law if the subjects perceive both the rule and ruler as legitimate 9 whereas Schachter
emphasized the role of “competence and authority” for a rule to be perceived to be
obligatory10 . Franck while discussing the above examples concluded that the above
discussion placed “emphasis on non-coercive factors as conducing to rule – compliant
behavior.” 11
1

Thomas M. Franck, ‘Legitimacy in the International System, 82 American Journal of International Law,
p. 705 (1988). [hereinafter Franck (1988)] “The surprising thing about international law is that nations ever
obey its strictures or carry out its mandate.’ (p. 705)
2
Franck (1988), p. 706
3
R. Dworkin, Law’s Empire, 1986, pp. 176-224 (Harvard University Press, Cambridge)
4
Harold Hongju Koh, ‘Why do nations obey international law?’ 106, Yale Law Journal, 2599, 2628-29,
2633, 2643 (1997)
5
Robert O. Keohane, ‘International Relations and International Law: Two Optics’, 38 Harvard
International Law Journals, 487, 491-93 (1997)
6
A. Mark Weisburd, ,’The Emptiness of the Concept of Jus Cogens, as Illustrated by the War in BosniaHerzgovina’, 17 Michigan Journal of International Law, 1, 32, 37 (1995)
7
Setear, John K., An Iterative Perspective on Treaties: A Synthesis of International Relations Theory and
International Law, 37 Harvard International Law Journal, 139, pp. 162-73 (1996)
8
Sean D. Murphy, ‘The Security Council, Legitimacy, and the Concept of Collective Security After the
Cold War’, 32 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law. 201, 249-251 (1994)
9
M. Weber, 1968, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretative Sociology, 31 (G. Roth & C. Wittich
eds.)
10
Oscar Schacter, ‘Towards a Theory of International Obligation’, 8 Vanderbilt J. International Law, 300
(1968), [hereinafter Schacter (1968)]
11
Franck (1988) p. 710
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Weiler12 tried to discuss the legitimacy of WTO Dispute Settlement System while
Palmeter 13 has discussed legitimacy in the context of the World Trade Organization
(WTO). Aldonas14 observed that as the Panels and the Appellate Bodies develop a body
of jurisprudence that clarifies WTO members’ commitments, it “establishes the WTO’s
legitimacy and commands the respect of its members”
Thomas Franck’s Theory of Legitimacy
The study of legitimacy in international rule occupies a very significant place in
international relations because it envisages “the possibility of an orderly community
functioning by consent and validated obligation” 15 Franck has further emphasized that the
“the legitimacy of a rule, or of rule- making or rule-applying institution, is a function of a
perception of those in the community concerned that the rule, or the institutions, has
come into being endowed with legitimacy; that is in accordance with right process.” 16
Legitimacy has been defined by Professor Franck as “a property of a rule or rule making
institutions which itself exe rts a pull towards compliance on those addressed
normatively” 17 and also “the perception of those addressed by a rule or a rule making
institution that that rule or institution has come into being and operates in accordance
with generally accepted principles of right process.” 18
The primary purpose of Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights 19 (TRIPS) was to ‘reduce distortion and impediments to international trade’ taking
into account ‘effective and adequate protection’ to patents, copyrights and trademarks in
private laws of different countries 20 . TRIPS is supposed to provide for the protection of
many forms of so called intellectual property such as Copyright, Trademarks, Industrial
12

J.H.H. Weiler, ‘The rule of Lawyers and the Ethos of Diplomats: Reflections on the Internal and External
Legitimacy of WTO Settlement’, Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper 9/2000, The Jean Monnet Seminar
and Workshop on the European Union, NAFTA and the WTO Advanced Issues in Law and Policy,
Harvard Law School, Cambridge (2000) [hereinafter Weiler (2000)]
13
David Palmeter, ‘The WTO as Legal System’, 24 Fordham International Law Journal, p. 444, 447
14

G.D. Aldonas, The World Trade Organization: Revolution in International Trade Dispute Settlements”
(1995) 3 Dispute Resolution Journal 73 at 79
15
Franck (1988), “Yet there is a stronger motivation for studying legitimacy in the international system
than the academic objective of creating a bridge from national to international speculative jurisprudence. A
teleology that makes legitimacy its hypothetical center envisages – for purposes of speculative inquiry—the
possibility of an orderly community functioning by consent and validated obligation rather than by
coercion.” (p. 710)
16
Franck (1988), p. 711
17
Franck, The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations (1990) p. 16, Oxford University Press, USA
[hereinafter Franck (1990)],
18
Franck (1990), p. 19
19
Annex 1C – Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, The Results of the
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations: The Legal Texts
20
Preamble to the TRIPS Agreement, “Desiring to reduce distortions and impediments to international
trade, and taking into account the need to promote effective and adequate protection of intellectual of
intellectual property rights, and to ensure that measures and procedures to enforce intellectual property
rights do not themselves become barriers to legitimate trade;…”
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Designs, Patents, Integrated Circuits Layouts, and Trade Secrets through enactment of
national laws to meet certain limited standards. Otten and Wager even insisted that “the
protection of intellectual property is one of the three pillars of the WTO, the other two
being trade in goods (the area traditionally covered by the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT) and the new agreement on trade in services (General Agreement on
Trade in Services).” 21
There was not much divergence of views among the nations once they agreed to include
TRIPS in the Uruguay Round Negotiations as far as copyrights and trademarks were
concerned but the question of patent got intricately linked with technology transfer and
promotion of public policies like public health and emergency and led to a series of
frictional developments. A large number of countries appear to evince skepticism about
the possibility of TRIPS fulfilling any of its cherished goals of removing distortions and
impediments to international trade and promoting “technological innovation” and “the
transfer and dissemination of technology” 22.
Reluctance of different countries, including many developed countries to adopt
provisions of TRIPS is still keeping scholars busy discussing the approach to be adopted
to introduce TRIPS compliant provisions in their domestic laws23 .
In this article an attempt is made to find helpful perspective on this dilemma in the work
of international legal scholar Thomas Franck against the background of his theory of
international legitimacy. The theory developed in Franck’s “The Power of Legitimacy
among Nations”24 and in his earlier article “Legitimacy in the International System” 25 is
based on the presumption that different international law exerts different “pull to
compliance” depending upon the extent to which “the rule is characterized by greater or
lesser” legitimacy. A major weakness of TRIPS has been uncertainty and unpredictability
in its scope and the total reliance for interpretations on the institutions from certain
industries and the judicial and the non-judicial institutions in the developed countries.
This Theory of Legitimacy isn’t only applicable to the states in the international
community but also to other international institutions.
Franck has analyzed legitimacy in terms of four factors:
1. Determinacy
2. Symbolic Validation
21

A. Otten and H. Wager, Compliance with TRIPS: The Emerging World View, 29 Vanderbilt J.
Transnational Law., 391, 393 (1996)
22
Article 7 of the TRIPS Agreement, “The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights
should contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to t transfer and dissemination of
technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge and in a manner
conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations.
23
Jerome H. Reichman, ‘The TRIPS Agreement comes of age: Conflict or Cooperation with the
Developing Countries?, 32 Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, p. (2000)
24
Thomas M. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations (1990) Oxford University Press, USA
25
Thomas M. Franck, Legitimacy in the International System, 82 A merican Journal of International Law,
705 (1988)
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3. Coherence
4. Adherence (to a normative hierarchy)
Franck has used the notion of “justice” when he states “A treaty may be the locus of a
lively dispute between those who wish to see it obeyed because it is legitimate even
though unjust and others who wish to see it repealed or even violated because it is unjust
although legitimate.” 26 In his book ‘Fairness in International Law and Institutions’ 27
Franck argued that “If a decision has been reached by a discursive synthesis of legitimacy
and justice, it is less likely to be disobeyed”. 28
Determinacy and Legitimacy
Although Franck started with the textual clarity as defining determinacy i.e. “the ability
of the text to convey a clear message, to appear transparent in the sense that one can see
through the language to the meaning”, subsequent discussion by Franck indicates that
determinacy in the form of certainty in the treaty interpretation is the fundamental
perquisite to legitimize a treaty. Franck observed that, “For present purposes it is enough
merely to note once more that clarity and certainty are, usually, but not invariably,
synonymous with determinacy.” 29 Franck discussed the example of the difference
between two textual formulations defining the boundary of the underwater continental
shelf to suggest the importance of certainty in an international treaty. In the 1958
Convention on the Continental Shelf 30, the boundary of the Continental Shelf was defined
as the shelf at “a depth of 200 meters or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of the
superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of the said areas.”
Compared to the 1958 Convention, the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea 31 is far
more definite and specific and the definition of the continental shelf has been given as
“the natural prolongation of …land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin,
or to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the
territorial shelf is measured” and certain important factors such as “the thickness of
sedimentary rocks” and a limit on outermost line that” shall not exceed 100 nautical miles
from the 2,500 meters isobath” are specifically mentioned. The isobath has also been
specifically defined as a line connecting the points where the waters are 2500 meters
deep.32 Franck concluded that, “The 1982 standard, despite its complexity is far more
determinate than the elastic standard in the 1958 Convention, which, in a sense,

26

Franck (1990), p. 238
Thomas M. Franck, 1995, Fairness in International Law and Institutions, Oxford Clarendon Press,
28
Franck (1995), p. 481
27

29

Franck (1990), p. 60
Convention on the Continental Shelf, Art 1, April 29, 1958, 15 UST 471, TIAS No. 5578, 499 UNTS
311
31
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Art. 76, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, UN Doc.
A/CONF.62/122, reprinted in United Nations, Official Text of the United Nations Convention of the Law
of the Sea with Annexes and Index, UN Sales No. E. 83.V.5 (1983), 21 ILM 1261 (1982)
32
Franck (1988), p. 714
30
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established no rule at all…Indeterminate normative standards not only made it harder to
know what conformity is expected, but also make it easier to justify noncompliance” 33
Franck has maintained that states are normally inclined to violate a rule of conduct to
take advantage of sudden opportunity but this temptation may be checked if the rule is
“sufficiently specific to support reasonable expectations that benefit can be derived in a
contingent future by strengthening the rule in the present instance.” 34
Franck gave an example of the cost of indeterminacy by the rules prohibiting and
defining aggression by the United Nations General Assembly after 7 years of debate.
While dealing with determinacy, Franck made another very pertinent point that “A
clearly determinate treaty or custom may be rendered incoherent …by inconsistent state
conduct…”35
However, Franck did not confine his concept of determinacy within the situation, which
happened to be ‘essentially binary’, or is applicable of a true-false test. In situations of
exceptional complexity and ambiguity which normally happens in the case of
international treaties, the ambiguities and the errors of interpretations can be resolved by
a forum or fora which in its turn must have attributes of legitimacy.
Process determinacy is the situation where “ambiguity can be resolved case by case”
through the introduction of a forum which can mitigate “the textual elasticity of the rule.”
However, the forum itself should be perceived as “having come into being in accordance
with right process. In practice legitimacy of a forum can be tested in the same way as that
of a rule: by reference to the determinacy of its charter, its pedigree, the coherence of its
mandate and its adherence to the normative institutional hierarchy of international
organization.” 36 . Franck gave a number examples of situations where determinacy in
specific conflict was introduced in the treaty through such fora37 .
This article will show that the TRIPS Agreement particularly Articles 1.1, 27 and 33 have
used language, which has resulted in introduction of extreme forms of ambiguity and
uncertainty in the TRIPS Agreement. This article further shows that an examination of
the Panel and the Appellate Body Reports dealing with patenting and similar provisions
suggests that these fora are creating significant problems in process determinacy and the
results have been more adverse than useful especially for developing countries.
33

Franck (1988), p. 714
Franck (1988), p. 716
35
Franck (1990), p. 238
36
Franck, (1988) p. 725. Franck was quite categorical about the legitimacy of forum to arrive at process
determinacy when he observed, “They (forums) will only succeed, however, if they are seen to be acting in
accordance with their specific mandate and the general principles of fairness; that is, in a disinterested,
principle fashion and not simply to gratify some short-term self-interest of a faction. Moreover, each rule
decision emanating from legitimate forum is itself subject to the test of its perceived legitimacy; its
determinacy, coherence, and so forth” p. 725
37
Franck (1988) gave examples from Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), 1985 ICJ REP.
13, 30 31 (judgement of June 3), North Sea continental Shelf (FRG/Den.; FRG/Neth.), 1969 ICJ REP. 3, 54
(Judgement of Feb. 20), Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya ), 1982 ICJ REP. 18, 35
(Judgement of Feb. 24)
34

6

Symbolic Validation and legitimacy
Just like determinacy, symbolic validation, ritual and pedigree also influence voluntary
obedience and pull to co mpliance. Symbolic validation, ritual and pedigree are related but
not identical. Whereas symbolic validation uses certain cues for obedience, ritual is a
specialized form of symbolic validation. Rituals are normally seen as ceremonies and
provide unspoken basis for compliance pull like the oath of office sworn by the US
President. In this article, rituals as a major force have not been adopted. However, the
notion of pedigree is quite important for explaining the compliance pull of “rules or rulemaking institutions by emphasizing their historical origins, their cultural or
anthropological deeprootedness.” 38 . State recognition has been described by Franck as
illustrating the importance of pedigree. Schachter has tried to emphasize the long lineage
of rules s uch as codification practice followed by the International Law Commission after
long deliberations as being more attractive for compliance than a fresh development.39
Franck also suggested that a “new rule may be taken more seriously if it arrives on the
scene under the aegis of a particularly venerable sponsor such as a widely ratified
multilateral convention, or a virtually unanimous decision of the International Court of
Justice.”40
In the context of the World Bank, Franck suggested that, “This equality of participation is
itself the symbolic representation of a confluence between sovereignty and
interdependence that holds together the “community” of states”41 . Franck has
subsequently developed the concept of pedigree as having its own rules and standards
and that these standards provide a fairly high degree of formal determinacy prohibiting
“self-serving interpretations”. Franck also cautioned against the general acceptance of
symbolic validation and pedigree in the context of compliance and asserted that the
rituals themselves have to be legitimate and the standards for pedigreeing are applied
coherently to give legitimacy to an international treaty.
This article argues that because of the way the TRIPS Agreement was prepared, the
circumstances contemporaneous with its completion, and certain aspects of its treatment
of questions related to patents, there are substantial problems associated with pedigree
which does not attract compliance by the parties involved.
Coherence and Legitimacy
Coherence or symbolic equality creates “presumption against all purported interpretations
of existing rules—and against proposed new rules—that would make arbitrary
distinctions between the rights and duties of different states or governments”.42 Using the
definition of coherence from Ronald Dworkin, that “a rule is coherent when like cases are
38

Franck, (1988) p. 726
Oscar Schachter, Towards a theory of International Obligation, 8 Vanderbilt Journal of International
Law, 300, 310 (1968)
40
Franck (1988) p. 727
41
Franck (1988), p. 731
42
Franck, 1988, p. 737
39
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treated alike in application of the rule and when the rule relates in a principled fashion to
other rules of the same system”43 , Franck noted that incoherence directly questions the
effect of validity by undermining the standard, rules and processes used which in turn
question the legitimacy of the institutions responsible for validating. Weiner while
interpreting Franck’s theory of legitimacy opined that incoherence leads to establis hment
of “cognitive dissonance in the audience to which it is addressed.” 44 Dworkin has used
the word “integrity” or “consistency” which requires that a rule must be applied
uniformly in every “similar” or “applicable” instance.
Franck has tried to identify another aspect of coherence, which he called the “underlying
general principle” connecting rule, standard, or symbolic validation to a network of other
rules. Franck concluded that “coherence mandates a connectedness between various
component parts of a rule or code; between several applications of a rule in various
instances; and between the general principles underlying a rule’s application and those
implicated in other rules.” 45
Franck further elaborated the role of coherence in his book ‘The Power of Legitimacy
Among Nations’ and observed that coherence legitimates a rule, principle, or
implementing institution because it provides a reasonable connection between a rule, or
the application of a rule, to (1) its own principle purpose, (2) principles previously
employed to solve similar problems, and (3) a lattice of principles in use to resolve
different problems. 46 The given rule must be in certain harmony with the existing
network of rules of which the present rule is a part.
This article argues that as a consequence of the introduction of certain provisions in
TRIPS in the form of extending monopoly to import and extend and discriminatory
extension of patent provisions, TRIPS severely compromises the extent to which its terms
show some of the qualities of Franck’s coherence. This article suggests that one reason
TRIPS will not experience success in terms of its acceptability is that the TRIPS
Agreement is, in the sense of Franck’s theory, substantially illegitimate. Accordingly, this
article concludes that if the TRIPS is to be treated as an internationally accepted
agreement, a number of changes have to be introduced into the TRIPS Agreement
Adherence (to a Normative Hierarchy) and Community
The lack of crucial procedural “secondary” rules in the international legal system makes
the whole system primitive if not illusory. Hart has also alleged that the lack of a
“uniform rule of recognition” 47 such as the U.S. Constitution or British Rule of
Parliamentary Supremacy, and specific sources of law are a serious disqualification for
an international legal system. Franck adopted Hart’s concept of hierarchy of secondary
43

R. Dworkin, Laws Empire, 176-224 (1986)
Anthony S. Weiner, ‘The CISG Convention and Thomas Franck’s Theory of legitimacy’, Journal of
International Law & Business, Fall 1998, 19, p. 1, 22
45
Franck, 1988, p. 750
46
Franck (1990), pp. 147-148
47
Franck (1988) p. 752
44
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rules starting from the “ultimate rule of recognition” 48 corresponding to H.L.A. Hart’s
concept of a “rule of recognition” and going down to a “pyramid of secondary rules
about how rules are made, interpreted and applied: rules, in other words, about rules.”
The primary rule of obligations without adherence to a system of secondary rules of
process has been termed by Franck as nothing but ad hoc reciprocal arrangements.
However, Franck observed that the international system is better developed than had been
visualized by Hart and as shown by a number of institutions such as the International
Court of Justice and the European Court of Justice and the presence of arbitrators that “it
has an extensive network of horizontally coherent rules, rule making institutions, and
judicial and quasi- judicial bodies to apply the rules impartially” 49 . Franck has described
the rule of ultimate recognition as having such extraordinary power so as to validate the
primary rule of obligations as well as the secondary rule of procedural nature.
Palmeter has discussed Hart’s 50 primary and secondary rule concept in connection with
the World Trade Organization as a legal system although his interpretation appears to be
little too simple. 51 However, Palmeter has used a very valid term “thickening of legality”
coined by Professor Celso Lafer, former Ambassador and permanent Representative of
Brazil to the WTO to denote the proliferation of rules in the WTO. 52 According to Hart,
the secondary rules specify the manner of conclusively ascertaining, introducing,
eliminating, varying and determining the violations of primary rules. Although Hart has
described three types of secondary rules, i.e. (1) rules of recognition, (2) rules of
adjudication, and (3) rules of change, the rules of recognition are by Franck as the most
important.
The ultimate rule of recognition is more in the nature of peremptory norms when Franck
observed that, “Ultimate rules of recognition cannot be validated by reference to any
other rule. All other secondary rules of the community are inferior to, and validated by,
the ultimate rule or set of rules.” 53 If sovereignty resides in anything, it is in the rules
themselves and States are aware of this “rule’s autochthony” as illustrated by the
advisory opinion rendered by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on April 26, 1988.
The ICJ stated unequivocally that it is “the fundamental principle of international law
that it prevails over domestic law, “ and that “the provisions of municipal law cannot
prevail over those of a treaty.” 54
48

Franck (1990) p. 184
Franck (1988), p. 753
50
H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, Chapter 10, 2nd Edition, 1994
51
David Palmeter, ‘The WTO as Legal System’, Fordham International Law Journal, vol. 24, p. 444, 447
(2000) [hereinafter Palmeter (2000)]
52
Palmeter, 2000, p. 467
53
Franck (1988), p. 754 Franck while looking for such ultimate rule did ask, “It is the nature of community,
therefore, both to empower authority and to circumscribe it by an ultimate rule or set of rules of recognition
that exists above, and itself is not circumscribed by, the system of normative authority. Does such a notion
of community exist internationally, among states? Do nations recognize an ultimate rule or set of rules of
recognition or process by which the legitimacy of all other international rules and procedures can be tested,
a rule not itself to a higher normative test of its legitimacy, a rule that simply is, because it is accepted as
font of the community’s collective self-definition?”, p. 754
54
1988 I.C.J. REP. 12, 34, para. 57 (Advisory Opinion of 26th April, 1988). The observer Mission of the
Palestine Liberation Organization was created by GA Res. 3237, 29 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 4, UN
49
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In fact, Franck put the adherence as peremptory norms as described in Article 53 of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties along with pacta sunt servanda, the good faith
doctrine and the concept of primary and secondary rules as envisioned by Hart as
important elements providing legitimacy to international treaty. State equality has been
identified by Franck as an example of the ultimate rule of recognition.
Ultimately, Franck concluded that, “It is therefore circumstantially demonstrable that
there are obligations that states acknowledge to be necessary incidents of community
membership. These are not perceived to obligate because they have been accepted by the
individual state but, rather, are rules in which states acquiesce as part of their own
validation; that is, as an inseparable aspect of “joining” a community of states that is
defined by its ultimate secondary rules of process.” 55
Franck used Dworkin’s term “associative obligations”56 for secondary rules of
recognition, which gets attached to all states because they are validated members of the
international community. This is not consensual but is acquired by associa tion. The true
community has been defined by Dworkin where “the members accept that they are
governed by common principles, not just by rules hammered out in political
compromise…Members of a society of principle accept that their political rights and
duties are not exhausted by the particular decisions their political institutions have
reached, but depend, more generally, on the scheme of principles those decisions
presuppose and endorse.” 57
Dworkin confirmed that what a community of principle, “does is to validate behavior in
accordance with rules and applications of rules that confirm principled coherence and
adherence, rather than acknowledging only power of power.” 58 The problems in defining
and delineating a cohesive community of states by the TRIPS Agr eement impair the
development of this kind of adherence for its rules.

Doc. A/9631 (1974). The closure of the mission was required by the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1987, title X of
the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, 1988 and 1989, Pub. L. No. 100 -204, tit. X, s. 1001, 101 Stat.
1331, 1406 (codified at 22 U.S.C.A. s 5201-5203 (West Supp. 1988)
55
Franck (1988) p. 758. Franck further observed, “It is even possible to conclude that the members of the
global community acknowledge –for example-- each time they sign a treaty or recognize a new
government—that statehood is incompatible with sovereignty. They acknowledge this because they must,
so as to obtain and retain the advantages of belonging to an organized, sophisticated community,
advantages only available if ultimate sovereignty resides in a set of rules of universal application. That is
why states behave as if such rules existed and obligated” p. 758
56
R. Dworkin, p. 196
57
R. Dworkin, p. 211
58
Franck (1988), p. 759
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Compliance with TRIPS
The obedience to a rule is based on the perception by those to whom it is addressed as
legitimate. 59 Reichman60 , Reichman61 , Gerhart 62 , Maskus 63 , Giust64 among others have
discussed in details the compliance of both developed and developing countries with
TRIPS Agreement.
Two aspects of TRIPS, one, that it imposes a wholly positive obligations as compared to
negative obligations and the other, that it is an international agreement which tests the
ability of international law to influence private actors through obligations imposed on the
state, are relevant for compliance scholarships.
Gerhart while discussing the ‘substantive validity’ that is “whether the ob ligation in
question meets an articulated standard of welfare” 65 tried to distinguish it from Franck’s66
theory of legitimacy. According to Gerhart, “The literature of legitimacy looks at the
process by which the international law is made and seeks to define the contours of
processes that add to the moral weight and functional acceptability of international
standards. The issue of substantive validity of a standard looks at the standard “on the
merits” and asks whether the measure is, in fact merited” 67. However, Gerhart
immediately suggests that compliance issues are closely intertwined with issues of the
substantive validity of international obligations.
Reichman appears to be of the view that the TRIPS Agreement is a revolutionary
agreement where developed countries were able to impose “a comprehensive set of
intellectual property standards on the rest of the world. As ultimately enacted, these were
not ‘minimum’ standards of intellectual property protection in the classical sense of the
term; rather, they collectively expressed most of standards of protection on which the
developed countries could agree among themselves.”68 According to Reichman, however,
the TRIPS standards are “likely to impose heavy social costs on most developing
countries in the short and medium terms, if only because these countries will now have to
59

Franck (1988), “…in a community organized around rules, compliance is secured –to whatever degree it
is-at least in part by perception of a rule as legitimate by those to whom it is addressed. Their legitimacy
will vary in degree from rule to rule and time to time. It becomes a crucial factor, however, in the capacity
of any rule to secure compliance when, as in the international system, there are no other compliance
inducing mechanisms.” (p. 706)
60
Jerome H. Reichman, 1998, ‘Securing compliance with the TRIPS Agreement After US v India’, Journal
of International Economic Law (1998) p. 586-601
61
Jerome H Reichman, ‘The TRIPS Agreement comes of Age: Conflict or Cooperation with the
Developing Countries’, 32 Case Western Res. Journal Of International Law, p. 423-452 (2000)
62
Peter M. Gerhart, ‘Reflections: Beyond Compliance Theory – TRIPS as a Substantive Issue’, 32 Case
Western Res. Journal of International Law, 393 (2000)
63
Keith E. Maskus, (2000) Intellectual Property Rights and Economic Development, Case Western Reserve
Journal Of International Law, Vol. 32, p. 471
64
John E Giust,. 1997, Noncompliance with TRIPS by Developed and Developing Countries: Is TRIPS
Working?, Indiana International Law and Comparative Law Review, vol. 8, p. 69-97
65
Gerhart (2000) p. 361
66
Thomas M. Franck, (1995), Fairness in International Law and Institutions, Oxford, Clarendon Press
67
Gerhart (2000) p. 362
68
Reichman (1998) p.586
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pay more in order to acquire the tools they need to overcome the technology gap.”69
Reichman appears to be advocating that imposition of the TRIPS Agreement was a
justified act on the part of developed countries when he says that
“…a relentless series of questionnaires emanating from the WTO has sought to focus
the attention of the Council for TRIPS on the state of play in the different member
countries. The developing countries have also been subjected to overt and covert
pressures for early implementation of the TRIPS Agreement, although it seems fair to
observe that such pressures are not necessarily inconsistent with the short transitional
period this Agreement makes available to developing countries-as distinct from leastdeveloping countries.” 70
Both developed and developing countries have been found wanting in enacting TRIPS
compliant legislation. Giust has given examples from Ireland, the UK, the USA, and
Japan from the developed count ries and India from developing countries to show that
some of the provisions in these countries were not in agreement with TRIPS. However,
while giving examples, Giust does not appear to have shown deep critical approach while
examining the issue of non-compliance of these countries with the TRIPS Agreement. In
case of Ireland and the UK, the presence of ‘local working was regarded as violative of
Article 27.1 of TRIPS dealing with non-discrimination in enjoyability of patent rights
with respect to technology, locally produced or imported and the place of inventions71
without realising that non- local working is an abuse of patent right under Article 5A(2) of
the Paris Convention.
This article examines the extent of non-compliance of developed countries with TRIPS
and the impossibility of developing countries to comply with the provisions of the TRIPS
because of indeterminate nature of TRIPS provisions and the continuous changes in the
interpretations by the judicial and non-judicial institutions in the USA and other
developed countries. In case of the USA, Giust has mentioned the 35 U.S.C. s. 102 (e)
and Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 as not complying with the provisions of the
TRIPS Agreement. 72 Giust also discussed Section 337 of the US Tariff Act of 1930
which permits US companies to file a complaint at the United States ITC against a
foreign company for infringing US companies intellectual property rights. Section 337
69

Reichman (1998) p. 587.
Reichman (1998) p. 593
71
Giust, (1997), pp. 86-87
72
Giust, 1997, pp. 87-88, “Even though the US Patent laws were amended by the Uruguay Round
Agreements Act (URAA), the amendment left 35 U.S.C. 102(e) in place as interpreted in the two In re
Hilmer decisions. In these decisions, the court held that a U.S. patent was available for prior art purposes,
i.e. “filed” as of its U.S. filing date, but a U.S. patent based on a foreign Paris Convention application was
not available for prior art purposes, i.e. was not “filed” as of its earlier international (Paris convention)
filing date. This interpretation of 35 U.S.C. 102(e) has been criticized as incorrect and a violating national
treatment in that equal treatment, for prior art purposes, is not given to U.S. patents based on foreign-filed
patents. Despite the scholarly controversy, the United States has thus far successfully maintained that 35
U.S.C. 102 (e) is consistent with its obligations of national treatment under the Paris Convention and
GATT. Barring some further event or the raising of the current level of scrutiny, it is likely that 102 (e)
will continue to walk border of compliance and non-compliance with the TRIPS national treatment
requirements.”
70
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authorizes the ITC (International Trade Commission of the USA) to issue a general
exclusion orders that would exclude the importation of products manufactured by nonparties to the ITC investigation. In 1987, the European Economic Community requested a
GATT dispute resolution with the United States. The GATT panel held that the United
States did not afford national treatment to foreigners under Section 337.73 Certain
superficial changes were made to section 337 through the Uruguay Round Agreement
Act (URAA)74 but in practice, Section 337 did not show much change.
Similar developments took place in Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974 of the
USA. The Panel in United States-Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 197475 ruled that
Section 304 of the US Patent Act violated Article 23 of the Dispute Settlement
Understanding 76 . The Panel in United States 301-310 observed:
“On this reading, the very discretion granted under Section 304, which under the US
argument absolves the legislation, is what, in our eyes, creates the presumptive
violation. The statutory language, which gives the USTR this discretion on its face,
precludes the US from abiding by its obligations under the WTO. In each and every
case when a determination is made whilst DSU proceedings are not yet exhausted.
Members locked in a dispute with the United States will be subject to a mandatory
determination by the USTR under a state which explicitly puts them in that very
danger which Article 23 was intended to remove.” 77
Some of the important compliance issues have been analyzed by Daya Shanker78 in
‘India, Pharmaceutical Industry and the Validity of TRIPS’ who expressed his doubt that
the developing countries would ever be able to comply with the provisions of the TRIPS
not only because of the text used in the TRIPS Agreement, but because of the attempt to
continuously change the contours of TRIPS Agreement by judicial and non-judicial
institutions in the developed countries which has made it nearly impossible for the
developing countries to bring their Patent Acts in line with the obligations under TRIPS.
Apart from non-compliance by the USA mentioned by Giust, Daya Shanker79 has
mentioned the absence of the requirement of invention in the US Patent Act which has
been affirmed by the Court of Appeals in State Street80 while extending patenting to
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GATT Panel Report on United States – Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1990, L/6439-36S/345, 1989
GATTPD Lexis 2 (Nov. 7, 1989) (unpublished)
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United States-Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974, WTO Doc WT/DS152/R dated 22 December
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dated 22 December 1999
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Daya Shanker, India, Pharmaceutical Industry and the Validity of TRIPS, Working Paper, Department
of Economics, University of Wollongong, Australia (2001). The paper is available in SSRN Journals at
SSRN_ID295384_code011231510.pdf [hereinafter Daya Shanker-India, Pharmaceutical Industry and the
Validity of TRIPS (2001)] An edited version is forthcoming.
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13

business methods, as a very crucial non-compliance of the TRIPS Agreement by a major
proponent of TRIPS. Article 27.1 of TRIPS makes it clear makes that “Subject to the
provisions of Article 2 and 3, patents shall be available for any inventions, whether
products or processes in all fields of technology provided that they are new involve an
inventive step and are capable of industrial application.” Note 5 of the TRIPS Agreement
relating to Article 27.1 of TRIPS accommodates to some extent the position of the USA
by deeming “inventive step” as ‘non-obvious’ and “capable of industrial application” as
“useful” but the requirement for invention has not been waived by TRIPS Article 27.
In fact, in the ‘Communication from the United States to the Negotiating Group on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual property Rights, including Trade in Counterfeit
Goods’ dated 11th May 1990, the USA did not use the word invention. 81 The USA Patent
Act is in breach of the TRIPS Agreement. Similarly Sections 204 82 and 20983 of the US
Patent Act requiring that the patents developed with the help of the US government
finance has to be used for manufacturing the said patented product in the USA, is in
violation of the non-discrimination stipulation of Article 27 which enjoins that there shall
be no discrimination in enjoyability of patent rights regarding place of invention and
whether products are imported or locally produced. Similarly, the Bolar Exemption84
giving extension to the patents for pharmaceutical products and which has been an issue
in the dispute between Canada and the EC 85 would be violative of Article 30 of TRIPS in
terms of the interpretation given by the Panel in its Report on Canada-Patent Protection86 .
The extension of patents given to pharmaceutical products by the EC 87 , Australia88 ,
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MTN.GNG/NG11/W/70 dated 11 May 1990, Article 23 Patentable Subject Matter “Patents shall be
granted for all products and processes, which are new, useful, and unobvious.”
82
35 U.S.C.Sec. 204, “Preference for United States Industry: Notwithstanding any other provision of this
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manufacture is not commercially feasible.
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person and privileged and confidential and not subject to disclosure under section 552 of title 5 of the
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Canada-Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products Panel Report, WTO Doc. WT/DS114/R dated
17.3.2000 [hereinafter Canada-Patent Protection]
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In the later part of this article, the incongruity of Canada-Pharmaceuticals with ‘customary rules of
interpretation of public international law’ has been discussed.
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Special Protection Certificate giving extension up to five years to pharmaceutical products

14

Israel89 , Japan90 , and the USA91 are provisions violating the non-discrimination
stipulation of Article 27.1 of TRIPS.
One of the disconcerting parts of this development is that proposals for extension of
patent period in situations invoking regulatory approval has been attempted to be
introduced through the use of Dispute Settlement System of the WTO by both the USA92
and the EC 93 apart from Switzerland and Austria after this proposal had not been agreed
to in the final draft of the TRIPS Agreement. Similar provisions were part of the
negotiations in NAFTA and are present in the Final Agreement. 94
Another example is the removal of ‘local working’ from the UK Patent Act and the
European Patent Convention as late as 29th July 1999. Before the amendment of the UK
Patent Act in July 1999, the ’local working’ provisions in Section 48(3) in the UK Patent
Act read as
“(a) Where the patented invention is capable of being commercially worked in the United
Kingdom, that it is not being so worked to the fullest extent that is reasonably practicable;
(b) Where the patented invention is a product, that a demand for the product in the United
Kingdom(i)
is being met to a substantial extent by importation

88

The Intellectual Property Laws Amendment Act 1998 amended the Australian Patents Act 1990 to give
effect to the government’s decision to provide for an extension of term scheme for pharmaceutical patents.
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Article 1709(12) of the North American Free-Trade Agreement, which was similarly based on the
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“Each party shall provide a term of protection for patents of alt least 20 years from the date of filing or 17
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compensate for delays caused by regulatory approval.”
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(c) Where the patented invention is capable of being commercially worked in the United
Kingdom, that it is being prevented or hindered from being so worked(i)
where the invention is a product, by the importation of the product”
The UK High court (Chancery Division-Pates Court) justified the provision in Extrude
Hone v. Heathway Machine Sales 95 by observing
“The grant of a compulsory license is plainly not in terms a qualitative restriction. Nor
is it, in my view, a measure having equivalent effect. It is, however, calculated to
encourage competition and is entirely in accord with the general concept of the Treaty
[Treaty of Rome]”
This provision stayed in the UK Patent Act till 29th July 1999 in spite of adverse
comment by the European court of Justice in Smith-Kline and French Laboratories v.
Generics 96 . The provision was compatible with Article 5A(2) of the Paris Convention97
which through incorporation in the TRIPS Agreement vide Article 2.1 and Article 2.2
became an integral part of the WTO 98 and as per Article 2.2 of TRIPS, the provisions of
Article 5A(2) of the Paris Convention cannot be affected by another provision in Parts I
to IV of the TRIPS Agreement.99 A provision which was perfectly compatible with the
TRIPS Agreement was modified after more than four years ostensibly to bring it into line
with the TRIPS obligations through The Patents and Trade Marks (World Trade
Organization) Regulation 1999. As per the EC in Canada-Patent Protection, Article 63
does not permit presence of non-compatible provisions in the developed countries’ Patent
Acts such as the United Kingdom’s after 1st January 1996. Further developments such as
the United States move against Brazil in the WTO clearly indicate that the purpose of this
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Industry and the Validity of TRIPS’.
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amendment was to bring changes in the TRIPS Agreement which the parties didn’t arrive
at during the Uruguay Round negotiations 100.

Comparative Legitimacy of TRIPS Agreement
Indeterminacy and TRIPS
Reichman101 is of the view that the TRIPS Agreement is largely indeterminate i.e. the
TRIPS Agreement contains standards which are neither clear nor unambiguous and the
language is undefined. Gerhart 102 even suggests that the Panel Report in Canada-Patent
Protection of Pharmaceutical Patents103 allowing imitators to manufacture patented
products before expiry of the patent term also introduced indeterminacy. Gerhart104found
that the Article 27 provision that a country must grant patents to inventions that are “new,
involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial application” is ambiguous as none
of these terms were defined nor were meanings completely harmonized.
Gerhart wondered whether their meanings would be attempted to be derived by blending
the various concepts from state patent statutes or how far a particular state may deviate
from the normal meaning of these terms and still stay in conformity with the TRIPS.
Reichman also questioned the role of exceptions in patenting and copyright and Article 6
of TRIPS which permits different regimes in exhaustion of patent rights. The freedom of
use of tax and competition policy to restrict intellectual property rights also leaves states
free to impair the rights. However, the majority of the points raised by Reichman are
pertaining to looking at indeterminacy from the point of view of industry associations
such as PhRMA in developed countries. The question of indeterminacy has been dealt
with by Daya Shanker in his article “India, Pharmaceutical Industry and the Validity of
TRIPS”105 where he has analyzed indeterminacy in its various forms such as uncertainty,
vagueness and malleability.
The major indeterminacy comes from the text of the TRIPS Agreement itself. A badly
worded Article 1.1 saying that “Members may, but shall not be obliged to, implement in
their law more extensive protection than is required by this Agreement, provided that
such protection doesn’t contravene the provisions of this Agreement’ initiates the
indeterminacy leaving practically no control over such extensions of protection except
100

Brazil – Measures Affecting Patent Protection: Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the United
States, WTO Doc. WT/DS199/3 dated 9th January. Daya Shanker, ’Brazil, the Pharmaceutical Industry and
the WTO’ 5 The Journal of World Intellectual Property January No. 1 (2002) has discussed this issue in
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Article 27.1 stipulating no discrimination between any field of technology, place of
invention and whether products are imported or locally produced. However, even this
interpretation has been questioned by the EC when in Canada-Patent Protection, it
insisted that the non-discrimination clause is not applicable to the extensions of
protection106. Every extension of protection is bound to increase the trade protection
particularly for patented products which specifically bans import of the patented products
through inclusion of word ‘import’ in Article 28 of the TRIPS Agreement. This is
followed by Article 6 of the TRIPS introduced at the instance of deve loped countries 107
permitting bans on parallel imports by individual countries or regional groups such as the
EC against the international commercial norms of exhaustion of rights on sale.
Articles 27.2 and 27.3 of the TRIPS use the term “Members may” regarding exclusion of
“inventions to protect human, animal or plant life or health or to avoid serious prejudice
to the environment” 108 and “diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods for treatment of
human or animals” but “may” can be argued as “shall” in certain circumstances but
following the textual approach “may” permits all the subject matter mentioned in Articles
27.2 and 27.3 to be patentable subject matter. Article 33 of the TRIPS Agreement dealing
with terms of protection is similarly worded. It permits unlimited protection when it says
“The term of protection available shall not end before the expiration of a period of twenty
years from the filing date” which permits no fixed term of protection and a patent may be
extended for any period with its mo nopolistic rent seeking consequences as happened in
the case of pharmaceutical products and extension of copyright period in the USA.
Reichman’s 109 indeterminacy conception of TRIPS was mostly confined to exceptions
under Article 30 and 31 of the TRIPS. Exceptions normally don’t introduce
indeterminacy but the permission to extend protection without any limit in terms of
patentability of the subject matter and unlimited extension of term of patents
fundamentally changes the concept of TRIPS and raises questions about its validity. .
Even the smallest increase in the term of protection is an increase in the trade
protectionism, a concept totally antithetical to the free trade and the Most Favored Nation
Treatment on the basis of which the whole of WTO structure was erected.
Franck has also discussed the introduction of indeterminacy in a treaty through the
“inconsistent state conduct”. The concept of “inconsistent state conduct” has been
analyzed by Daya Shanker 110. In brief, the extension of patenting to ‘Bus iness Methods’
and ‘computer programs’ on the basis of a flawed interpretation of superior judicial
decisions, the direction by the European Patent Office to change the term computer
programs into computer inventions, removal of ‘local working’ from the UK Patent Act
through the introduction of The Patents and Trade Marks (World Trade Organization)
Regulations 1999 in the UK Patent Act are some of the examples where the “inconsistent
state conduct” has introduced indeterminacy in the TRIPS Agreement.
106
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Process Determinacy and DSU
The Panel in United States Sections 301-310 was quite categorical in stating the
importance of determinacy when it observed
“What are the objects and purposes of the DSU111, and the WTO more generally, that
are relevant to a construc tion of Article 23? The most relevant in our view are those
which relate to the creation of market conditions conducive to individual economic
activity in national and global markets and to the provision of a secure and predictable
multilateral trading system.” 112
Article 3.2 of the DSU is one of the main instruments, which has aptly described the
purpose of the dispute settlement system of the WTO as providing security and
predictability. 113
The Panel in United States Sections 301-310 observed that after creation of free market
conditions, the central element of the WTO was to provide “security and predictability to
the multilateral trading system” 114 A large number of Appellate Body decisions such as
the Appellate Body Report on Japan-Alcoholic Beverages115 .
No doubt the Panel is to follow the judicial economy but at the same time “the basic aim
of dispute settlement in the WTO is to settle disputes… we do not consider that Article
3.2 of the DSU is meant to encourage either panels or the Appellate Body to make law by
clarifying existing provisions of the WTO Agreement outside the context of resolving a
particular dispute. As panel need only to consider those claims which must be addressed
in order to resolve the matter in issue in the dispute.”116
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Annex 2 – Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes of Legal Text
[hereinafter DSU]
112
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Similarly in India-Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical
Products 117 , where the Appellate Body observed, “India is obliged, by Article 70.8(a), to
provide a legal mechanism for the filing of mailbox applications that provides a sound
legal basis to preserve both the novelty of the inventions and the priority of the
applications as of the relevant filing and priority dates”. There are a number of other
Panel and GATT Reports also which recognize importance of security and predictability
as an object and purpose of the Dispute Settlement System and the WTO 118
However, in spite of the fact that the dispute settlement system is supposed to provide
“security and predictability” to the multilateral trading system, in this case the TRIPS
Agreement, as cons istently maintained by the Appellate bodies and the Panel Reports, the
constitution and the performances of the Dispute Settlement Bodies such as the Panels
and the Appellate Bodies do not inspire much confidence in their ability to introduce
certainty and predictability. Franck has maintained that the bodies responsible for process
determinacy themselves should have the character of being legitimate. The constitution of
the Panel lacks the most vital element that its members should have judicial competence
or judicial experience. Article 8 of the DSU119 dealing with ‘Composition of Panels’ says
“Panels shall be composed of well-qualified governmental or non-governmental
individuals, including persons who have served on or presented a case to a panel, served
as a representative of a Member or of a contracting party to GATT 1947 or as a
representative to the Council or Committee of any covered agreement or its predecessor
agreement or in the Secretariat, taught or published on international trade law or policy,
or served as a senior trade policy official of a Member.”
Not even one group mentioned in Article 8 of the Understanding is supposed to have a
judicial experience or judicial competence and the overall emphasis is essentially on the
trade officials who have participated in the negotiations. The concept of unbiased nonpartisanship approach, a primary requirement for members of any institution given the
responsibility of interpreting a law in case of conflict between the nations is an
anachronism to the groups qualified to become members of a Panel in Dispute Settlement
System of the WTO. The governmental officials who appear to form the backbone of the
DSU Panel invariably suffer from certain biases, a sense of insecurity and the ignorance
of judicial approach.
Non-transparency in the dispute settlement proceedings is another crucial issue. Prof.
Bhala while discussing the role of ‘stare decisis’ in the WTO adjudication observed that,
‘The fact that public cannot attend oral arguments, that submissions must be kept secret,
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and that they would not be accepted at all from NGOs or individuals is harder to justify to
the Anglo-American legal mind’120 .
An examination of the Panel and the Appellate Body Reports dealing with TRIPS
conflicts show that the performance of the Panels and the Appellate Bodies has not been
appropriate and at times, the Panel Reports and the Appellate Body reports have added
more to the unpredictability and uncertainty already present in the text of TRIPS through
injudicious, incoherent and at times contradictory decisions.
The important Panel and Appellate Body Reports dealing with TRIPS issues are IndiaPatent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products121, Canada –
Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products122, United States – Section 211 Omnibus
Appropriations Act of 1998123 , United States – Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act 124
and a Panel Report in United States – Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974 125 which
is related to the ‘Special 301’ with the ostensible purpose of threatening the countries
with unilateral action by the USA although that country may not be violating any of the
provisions of the TRIPS Agreement. There are two more Panel reports dealing with
TRIPS issues, one is Canada-Term of Protection126 and another Indonesian
Automobile127 with some argument pertaining to TRIPS. This article will mostly be
dealing with the reports pertaining to patent provisions as they are some of the most
controversial reports with a wide repercussions. United States – Section 110(5) of the US
Copyright Act 128is of little consequence in terms of its impact although the interest of
the Irish Rights Performing Organization against this provision of the US Copyright Law,
on whose behalf the EC initiated the dispute resolution proceedings against the US
exceptions can be questionable.
In India-Patent Protection129, the issue was a minor one dealing with establishment of a
mechanism under Article 70.8 of the TRIPS Agreement “by which application for patents
120
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reasoning process of panels and the Appellate Body and observed that it ‘is not as transparent as it might
be’.
121
India – Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products, Report of the
Appellate body, WTO Doc. WT/DS50/AB/R dated 19th December 1997
122
Canada – Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, Report of the Panel, WTO Doc. WT/DS114/R
dated 9th March 2000
123
United States – Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998, Report of the Appellate Body, WTO
Doc. WT/DS 176/AB/R January 2002
124
United States – Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act, Report of the Panel, WTO Doc. WT/DS160/R
dated 15th June 2000
125
United States – Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act 1974, Report of the Panel, WT/DS152/R dated 22
December 1999
126
Canada-term of Patent Protection, Report of the Appellate Body, WTO Doc. WT/DS170/AB/R dated
18th September 2000
127
Indonesia – Certain Measures Affecting Automobile Industry, Report of the Panel, WTO Doc.
WT/DS54/R, WT/DS55/R, WT/DS59/R and WT/DS64/R dated 2nd July 1998
128
United States – Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act, Report of the Panel, WTO Doc. WT/DS160/R
dated 15th June 2000
129
For the purpose of this article, the analysis is confined to Appellate Body Report where it is available.

21

for such inventions (pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical) can be filed” to preserve
novelty of the inventions and the priority of the applications as of the relevant filing and
priority dates. Any action on these application is to be taken only after 1 January 2005.
India issued “administrative instructions” for this purpose which has been labeled as
‘mail box’ system. The Panel and the Appellate Body in this dispute found that because
the Indian Patent Act had certain provisions which were not required to be changed till 1st
January 2005, these provisions may undermine “the administrative instructions” and
would not provide a “sound legal basis”130. The sections of the Indian Patent Act found
offensive by the Panel and the Appellate Body were
(a) substances intended for use, or capable of being used, as food or as medicines or drug
are not patentable
(b) When the complete specification has been led in respect of an application for a patent,
section 12(1) of the Indian Patent Act requires the Controller to refer that application
and that specification to an examiner
(c) Section 15(2) of the Indian Patent Act states that the Controller “shall refuse” an
application in respect of substance that is not patentable.
None of these provisions were required to be changed and all that was required was “to
provide a means” essentially to get the priority date. It is never required that it has to be
“sound legal basis” and that this “sound legal basis” 131 can come only from the Indian
Parliament.
However, subsequent examination of the Panel and Appellate Body Reports in United
States – Sections 301-310132 and United States – Section 211 Omnibus Appropriation Act
of 1998 suggests a different approach.
In United States – 301-310, the Panel after observing that, “The risk of a unilateral
determination of inconsistency as found in the statutory language of Section 304 itself
has an equally apparent “chilling effect” on both members and the market-place even if is
not quite certain that such a determination would be made” found Section 304
inconsistent with Article 23.
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However, the Panel after concluding that the “statutory language of Section 304
constitute a serious threat that determinations contrary to Article 23.2(a) may be taken
and in the circumstances of this case, is prima facie inconsistent with Article 23.2(a) read
in the light in of Article 23.1” concluded “that this threat had been removed by the
aggregate effect of the SAA (Statement of Administrative Action) and the US statements
before this Panel in a way that also removes the prima facie inconsistency and fulfils the
guarantees incumbent on the US under Article 23.” 133
This acceptance of the US Statement of Administrative Action (SAA) which
accompanied the US legislation implementing the results of the Uruguay Round
submitted by the President to the US Congress did not suggest need for ‘sound legal
basis’. The Statement of Administrative Action was accepted in spite of Section 102(a) of
the US Uruguay Round Agreements Act 1994 says that
“(1) UNITTED STATES LAW TO PREVAIL IN CONFLICT. – No provision in any of
the Uruguay Round Agreements, nor the application of any such provision to any person
or circumstance, that is inconsistent with any law of the United States shall have effect.
(2) CONSTRUCTION. – Nothing in this Act shall be construed -…
(B) to limit any authority conferred under any law of the United States, including
section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 unless specifically provided for in this Act”.
It is difficult to reconcile this part of the US Uruguay Round Act with ‘sound legal basis’
provided by Statement of Administrative Action regarded consistency of Sections 301310 with the provisions of the WTO particularly when the Panel found them prima facie
inconsistent.
In fact, President’s Statement of Administrative Action also said that “other areas of
United States Intellectual property law are unaffected by the Agreement on TRIPS. For
example, the Agreement does not require any change in current United States law or
practice with respect the parallel importation of goods that are the subject of intellectual
property rights.” 134 It did not prevent the USA from disputing Brazil’s parallel import
provision, which is similar to US practice before the WTO135 .
Similar ambiguities from the Dispute Settlement Bodies’ decisions have been noticed in
United States – Section 211 where Section 211[a](2) saying “No U.S. court shall
recognize, enforce or otherwise validate any assertion of rights by a designated national
based on common law rights or registration obtained under such sectio n 515.527 of such
a confiscated mark, trade name, or commercial name.”
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Both Sections 211[a](2) and 211[b] denying access to judicial forums violate Article 42
of TRIPS 136 .
The Appellate Body in this case observed, “Civil judicial procedures would not be fair
and equitable if access to courts were not given to both complainants and defendants who
purport to be owners of an intellectual property right.” 137
Notwithstanding the text of the law of Section 211[a](2) and 211[b] expressly prohibiting
access of courts to designated national, the Panel and the Appellate Body accepted the
assertion of the US representative that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedures and the
Federal Rules of Evidence would be available and “after applying the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence, that an enforcement proceedings has
failed to establish ownership – a requirement of substantive law – with the result that it is
impossible for the court to rule in favor of that claimant’s or that defendant’s claim to a
trademark right, does not constitute a violation of Article 42.” 138
The net meaning of such interpretation by the Appellate Body would be that Sections
211(a)(2) and (b) are superfluous sections as people who do not have ownership of the
intellectual property prima facie do not have a right to move the court. Alternatively, the
provisions of Sections 211(a)(2) and (b) expressly prohibit designated nationals access to
the court. Whatever the interpretation, the “sound legal basis” does not appear to be
present anywhere in this case.
The last relevant Panel Report with very wide repercussions is that of Canada-Patent
Protection of Pharmaceutical Products139 which has been analyzed by Daya Shanker 140
in a number of his articles in view of the excessive constructionism indulged in by the
Panel in concluding that Article 27.1 would be applicable to Article 30 dealing with
exceptions in the TRIPS Agreement. The analysis of this Panel Report suggests that the
arguments of the parties and the conclusion of the Panel ignored the ‘customary rules of
interpretation of public international law’ as developed and applied by various Appellate
Bodies of the DSU and the main finding of application of Article 27.1 to exception under
Article 30 was based on Canada’s acknowledged point that Article 27.1 would be
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applicable to Article 31 and not on uninterested examination of facts and rules.141 The
argument of the EC and the acceptance of this argument by the Panel that objective under
Article 7 and purpose under Article 8, do not have any role in the interpretation led the
Council of Ministers at Doha to resort to Article IX of the Marrakesh Agreement for the
first time since the formation of the WTO to give the interpretation that
“In applying the customary rules of interpretation of public international law, each
provision of the TRIPS Agreement shall be read in the light of the object and purpose
of the Agreements as expressed, in particular, in its objectives and principles.” 142
The Panel while accepting the consistenc y of Canada’s Section 55.2(1) of its Patent Act
with Article 30 of TRIPS relied on the representations of Canada that products
manufactured during the 6 months period would not be sold for profit. 143 Similar
acceptance of the Panel’s report has been made by the Panel in US-Sections 301-310
where the Panel accepted the representations of the USA as to the manner in which the
United States would interpret the measure at issue. However, similar consideration was
not shown to India, in India – Patent Protection where the panel, as upheld by the
Appellate Body, refused to accept representations made by the Indian Government as to
the operation of its patent system and commitments/pledges by the Indian government
that it would implement its system in conformity with its WTO obligations.
Weiler while discussing the legitimacy of the WTO Dispute Settlement System
questioned the extraordinary influence of the WTO Secretariat on the Panel and
Appellate Body Reports in view of the judicial inexperience of the Panel and Appellate
Body members although he was kind to the performance of the Appellate Bodies. 144
Thus the composition of the Panel and the Appellate Bodies, the incoherent approach
adopted by the Panels which at times can be called discriminatory approach and ignoring
the customary rules of interpretation of public international law suggest that the present
141
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system of dispute settlement has not been very successful in introducing determinacy in
the TRIPS Agreement.

Symbolic Validation
The two forms of symbolic validation envisaged by Franck are “ritual” and “pedigree”.
As already discussed, ritual does not present relevant issue for discussion in this Article,
but the concept of pedigree as developed by Franck is a very relevant question for this
analysis. The historical origin and deeprootedness of any treaty along with the
codification practice followed by the International Law Commission (ILC) and the
unanimous decisions of the International Court of Justice improves the compliance pull
of an international treaty. However, Franck did not restrict “pedigree” as merely a matter
of hereditary lineage but considered it in the light of a broader concept to the extent the
person or institution responsible for the rule is perceived as “deserving to be obeyed” or
“deserving to be taken seriously.” 145
Although Reichman146 has quite repeatedly called the TRIPS Agreement “revolutionary”,
the Agreement does not appear to be characterized by deeprootedness or the
circumstances in which the TRIPS Agreement was prepared or adopted was perceived to
be “deserving to be obeyed.” An analysis of the circumstances leading to the finalization
of the TRIPS would bring out the relevant context of the circumstances in which the
TRIPS Agreement was finalized. Trade related aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
including trade in Counterfeiting Goods was introduced in the Ministerial Declaration of
20th September 1986. The negotiating objectives were stated as follows:
“In order to reduce the distortions and impediments to international trade, and taking
into account the need to promote effective and adequate protection of intellectual
property rights, and to ensure that measures and procedures to enforce intellectual
property rights don’t themselves become barriers to legitimate trade, the negotiations
shall aim to clarify GATT provisions and elaborate as appropriate new rules and
disciplines.”147
In spite of the pressure from the developed countries, the negotiations on TRIPS did not
proceed until the Ministerial Meeting held in Montreal in December 1988 where they
decided that Trade Negotiations Committee (TNC) should meet in Geneva during the
first week of April 1989 to continue discussions where the following clarifications were
made concerning TRIPS:
“Ministers agree that negotiations on this subject shall continue in the Uruguay Round
and shall encompass the following issues:
145
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(a) The applicability of the basic principles of the GATT and of relevant
international intellectual property agreements or conventions;
(b) The provision of adequate standards and principles concerning the
availability, scope and use of trade-related intellectual property rights;
(c) The provision of effective and appropriate means for the enforcement of
trade –related intellectual property rights, taking into account differences in
national legal systems;
(d) The provision of effective and expeditious procedures for the multilateral
prevention and settlement of disputes between governments, including the
applicability of GAT T procedures; and
(e) Transitional arrangements aiming at the fullest participation in the results of
the negotiations.
Ministers agreed that in the negotiations consideration will be given to concerns raised
by participants related to underlying public policy objectives of their national systems
for the protection of intellectual property, including development and technological
objectives.” 148
By March 1990, the strategy of developed countries changed and a series of draft legal
texts starting from the EC 149, followed by the USA150 and ending with the ‘Group of
14’151 were submitted. An examination of the GATT documents during the period
suggests that countries like Brazil, India, Thailand and Taiwan opposing the inclusion of
TRIPS as a whole and subsequently various provisions were brought in line by the action
of the United States under Special 301 although many scholars tend to suggest that the
use of Special 301 were accompanied with concession in other fields like textiles and
agriculture. On 20 th December, 1991 using ‘5+5’ and ‘10+10’ meetings, the TRIPS
Agreement was finalized from where majority of the recommendations of the developing
countries had been removed or circumscribed.152 Introduction of trade secrets and the
obligations in Article 2 of the TRIPS Agreement to comply with the major intellectual
property conventions contrary to accepted principles of international law were
vehemently opposed by the developing countries. 153
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Coercion and Validity of TRIPS
In TNT.GNGTRIPS/1154 , one of the participants expressed grave concerns about the
‘Special 30’ provisions of the existing United states Trade Law, which empowered the
United States Trade Representative to take unilateral retaliatory actions against
“offending” countries, enacted during the TRIPS negotiations and suggested that the
nomination of “priority foreign countries” was in itself a violation of the commitments
under the Punta del Este Declaration on standstill and rollback, which required
participants not to take any measures that would have improved their negotiating
positions. The complaint was that ‘the implementation of the United States Trade Law
against other countries, either at the stage of merely identifying priority countries or of
actual retaliation, would surely improve or strengthen the positions of the United States
and weaken the position of other countries. (para. 5)
This concern was supported by other countries, one of whom said that in spite of the
quick pace and positive attitude his country had shown in respect of the protection of
IPRs, it had been identified as one of the “Special 301” priority foreign countries. A
large number of countries expressed this concern that “Special 301” provisions was being
taken “in order to create pressure on countries to change their negotiating positions,” 155.
In 1984, the US Trade Act of 1974 underwent significant change with the authorization
to USTR to take action against the countries without a showing of injury if they do not
give adequate intellectual protection as per the US requirement. 156 After undergoing a
number of amendments 157 , the most important amendment was made during the Uruguay
Round negotiations through the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, called
Special 301 158 which gave a unilateral power to the USTR to identify foreign states
denying intellectual property protection to the United States firms as per the allegations
of the US industry and to designate them as different categories of culprits.
Once a country is designated as a “priority foreign country”, the USTR would have to
initiate an investigation within thirty days to determine whether foreign practices violated
the United States requirements on intellectual property or were unreasonable or
discriminatory. 159 The enhancement of the authority of the USTR laid enabled it to single
countries opposed to the TRIPS agreement for punitive action. The countries identified
on this list in 1989, immediately after the ‘Special 301’ was passed were India, Brazil,
Taiwan, and Thailand i.e. all the major countries which opposed inclusions of Intellectual
Property Rights in the Uruguay Round and were objecting to various provisions in the
TRIPS which in certain respect were far more restrictive than the then existing provisions
154
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in the developed countries. Gathii 160 was quite emphatic that the TRIPS Agreement came
about in its present form only because of the use of ‘Special 301’, which threatened the
negotiating parties to punitive actions in case of opposition. 161
Brazil’s Ambassador, Celso Amorium raised this issue in the GATT Council in May
1993 that,” By threatening to make use of unilateral trade measures, the US Government
reinforces doubts the international community has as to the sincerity of the US
commitments to the multilateral trade rules, as embodied in the GATT, as well as to the
negotiations in the Uruguay Round.” 162
Prohibition of the use of force in international treaty obligations has been accepted by
practically all the countries of the world including the USA. The most important one is
acceptance of the principle of the prohibition of the use of force in the declaration on
principles governing the mutual relations of States participating in the Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe (Helsinki, 1 August 1975), whereby the
“participating States undertake to “refrain in their mutual relations, as well as in their
international relations in general, “from the threat or use of force”163 . The International
Court of Justice 164 observed that, “Acceptance of a text in these terms confirms the
existence of an opinio juris of the participating States prohibiting the use of force in
international relations.”
The International Court of Justice165 made a very categorical observation regarding
prohibition of use of force when it observed
“A further confirmation of the validity as customary international law of the principle
of the prohibition of the use of force expressed in Article 2, paragraph 4, of the
Charter of the United Nations may be found in the fact that it is frequently referred to
in statements by State representatives as being not only a principle of such law. The
International Law Commission, in the course of its work on the codification of the law
of treaties, expressed the view that “the law of the Charter concerning the prohibitions
of the use of force in itself constitutes a conspicuous example of a rule in international
160
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law having the character of jus cogens” (paragraph (1) of the commentary of the
Commission to Article 50 of its draft Articles on the Law of Treaties, ILC Yearbook,
1966-II, p. 247). Nicaragua in its Memorial on the Merits submitted in the present case
states that the principle prohibiting the use of force embodied in Article 2, paragraph
4, of the Charter of the United Nations “has come to be recognized as jus cogens”.
The United States, in its Counter- memorial on the questions of jurisdiction and
admissibility, found it material to quote the views of scholars that this principle is a
“universal norm”, a “universal international law”, a “universally recognized principle
of international law”, a “principle of jus cogens”.
Templeman was categorical about use of coercion in the formation of the TRIPS
Agreement when he observed “All the increases of patent and copyright protection were
obtained by powerful lobbies persuading individual governments to take action and then
persuading all others to “harmonize” their legislation, thus obtaining worldwide
monopolies. There appears to be no public interest justification for the increases in
copyright protection; the extensions were not necessary to encourage authors. The excuse
for increases in patent protection are said to be the delay in the testing of pharmaceutical
and similar products for health and safety reasons after application has been made for a
patent.” 166 Templeman further says, “The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Proper ty Rights (The ‘TRIPS Agreement’) was obtained by the threat and
reality of trade sanctions and the withdrawal of aid. The TRIPS Agreement is now being
enforced by similar methods.” 167
As against mutual benefit of opening of the borders for free trade, the TRIPS “responded
only to the interests of the industrialized countries that would be the principal exporters
of intellectual property” 168 .
Gerhart observed that once the USA decided to include intellectual property in the
Uruguay Round with the help of other developed countries 169, the USA took away the
option of status quo i.e. the option to have no negotiations by insisting that if the
countries did not adopt intellectual property standards they would be left in a worse
situation. 170 In notes 28 and 30, Gerhart made it clear that the developing countries were
left with no choice and had to accept the TRIPS Agreement. Section 301 was used to
exert significant pressure on target countries and the developing countries were forced to
relent. The coercion story shows the underbelly of TRIPS that treaties are consensual and
getting an independent arbiter of substantial validity is quite difficult. The fact that
TRIPS is not resulted from real consent, does undermine the legitimacy of the TRIPS
166
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Agreement. It appears that the developing countries went along “not to make themselves
better off but to avoid being made worse off” 171
The threat and coercion was discussed in detail by the EC and the Panel in United States
– Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974.172 The EC while describing the effect of
Sections 301- 310 of the US Trade Act stated
“The European Communities maintains that in particular, the constant threat of
imposition of unilateral measures has an influence on the behavior and the decisions of
the econo mic operators. In practice, the fact of the filing of a petition or the simple
publication of a notice in the Federal Register announcing the initiation of an
investigation, within the concrete context of the provisions contained in Sections 301310 and the publicly known interpretation given by the US Administration and the
Congress created “chilling” trade effects that may range from the slowing down of
importation of products to the more radical stoppage of any bilateral trade with the
United States in those products.”
This observation of the EC was accepted by the Panel in United States-Section 301-310
where the Panel made observations as follows:
“When a Member imposes unilateral measures in violation of Article 23 in a specific
dispute, serious damage is created both to other Members and the market place.
However, in our view, the creation of damage is not confined to actual conduct in
specific cases. A law reserving the right for unilateral measures to be taken contrary to
DSU rules and procedures, may – as is the case here- constitute an ongoing threat and
produce a “chilling effect” causing serious damage in a variety of ways.”173
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The Panel in United States- Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974 made a final
observations regarding unilateral action that
“Our textual observation of Article 23.2(a) is thus confirmed when taking account also
of the other elements referred to in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention. Under this
reading the duty of members under Article 23 to have recourse to and abide by the
rules and procedures of the DSU and to abstain from unilateral determinations of
inconsistency, is meant to guarantee Members as well as the market-place and those
who operate in it that no such determination in respect of WTO rights and obligations
will be made.”
In spite of the Panel’s observations, the Fact Sheet released by the USTR regarding
Special “301” 174 which is not different from Section 301 of the Trade Act, 1974 and was
amended vide the Uruguay Round Agreements Act to bring it in conformity with the
WTO says that “a country can be found to deny adequate and effective intellectual
property protection even if it is in compliance with its obligations under the TRIPS
Agreement.”
The use of coercion, however, minor role it may have played in the formation of the
TRIPS Agreement would not make it easy for the Members to perceive this international
treaty as “deserving to be obeyed” or “deserving to taken seriously”.
Coherence
One of the fundamental aspects of legitimacy of international rules is a presumption
against arbitrariness between rights and duties of different states or governments. A
major argument developed by Franck to have coherence in a rule of international law is
to provide connection not only with specific principles but also with general principles (a
“lattice of principles”) used to solve a variety of other problems.
In discussing the determinacy of the TRIPS, two of the arguments forwarded were that
TRIPS while providing extraordinary power to patent holders of developed countries to
extend the temporary and limited monopoly at the same time insisting that nondiscriminatory provisions of the TRIPS would not be applicable to such extension175

thus reducing the relative competitive opportunity of their products on the market. Other operators may be
deterred from trading with such Member altogether, distorting potential trade. The damage thus caused to
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questions the presence of equality in an international treaty which makes it attractive for
compliance.
Similarly, provisions of TRIPS in Article 27 permitting patenting of all the inventions
notwithstanding that all the countries including major proponents of TRIPS had
specifically excluded scientific theories, mathematical methods, discoveries and materials
or substances, abstract ideas, business methods, computer programs from their patent acts
but a similar proposal in the document MTN.GNG/NG11/W/76 darted 23rd July, 1990
was removed from the final draft (Dunkel Text, 20th December 1991). The purpose was
to extend the scope of patentable subject matter without any limit particularly when
European Patent Conventions and the Patent Acts of its members had specifically
excluded these items from the subject matter. The business methods, computer programs,
abstract ideas, discoveries, have been excluded through various Supreme Court
Judgements in the USA. 176 Only in 1998, business methods were permitted to be a
patentable matter by the Court of Appeal in State Street, which was based mo re on the
US government directive than proper appreciation of the various US Supreme Court
Judgments. 177
This is a curious international agreements which when it was started by the EC through a
draft proposal (MTN.GNG/NG/11/W/68 dated 29th March 1990), it started with much
more stringent intellectual right provisions than was present in the domestic laws of the
major proponent countries. It is quite understandable that the international negotiations
start with extreme positions and then through negotiations a compromised middle
solution is brought about. However, in case of TRIPS, the negotiations started with
protections which were more stringent than the domestic patent laws of the major
proponents which became much more stringent during the TRIPS negotiations and
practically all the recommendations of the major groups of nations from developing
countries were either rejected outright or were circumscribed by the terms which can
make such provisions ineffective. One such provision is that of Article 8 of TRIPS which
says
“1. Members may, in formulating or amending their laws and regulations, adopt
measures necessary to protect health and nutrition, and to promote the public interest
in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and technological development,
provided that such measures are consistent with the provisions of this Agreement.
2. Appropriate measures, provided that they are consistent with provisions of this
agreement, may be needed to prevent the abuse of intellectual property rights by right
holders or the resort to practices which unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect
the international transfer of technology.”
The contents of the above provisions were essentially proposed by the developing
countries and were reflected in paragraph 8 of the part V of MTN.GNG/NG11/W/76
dated 23rd July, 1990 which reads as
8.
Principles
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8B.1 Parties recognize that intellectual property rights are granted not only in
acknowledgement of the contributions of inventors and creators but also to assist in the
diffusion of technological knowledge and its dissemination to those who could benefit
from it in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare and agree that this balance
of rights and obligations inherent in all systems of intellectual property rights should be
observed.
8B.2 In formulating or amending their national laws and regulations on IPRs,
PARTIES have the right to adopt appropriate measures to protect public morality,
national security. Public health and nutrition, or to promote public interest in sectors of
vital importance to their socio-economic and technological development.”
The circumscribing by the use of term “provided that they are consistent with the
provisions of this Agreement” has been used by the EC to argue that objects and purpose
of the TRIPS have no meaning as far as interpretations of other provisions of TRIPS are
concerned and they perform no other functions except being there. 178
Similarly, local working was accepted as one of the reasons for granting of compulsory
licensing by the EC in its proposed draft. 179 However, on 16 th December 1991 in a
‘10+10’ Meeting180, the last clause of Article 27.1 was added 181 which states
“Subject to paragraph 4 of Article 65, paragraph 8 of Article 70 and paragraph 3 of
this Article, patents shall be available and patent rights enjoyable without
discrimination as to the place of invention, the field of technology and whether
products are imported or locally produced.”
However, in view of Article 5A(2) of the Paris Convention which specifically identified
non- local working as one of the abuses for issuing compulsory licenses, local working
continued to be a TRIPS compatible provisions and continued to be present in the
European Patent Convention and the UK Patent Act till 1999 and in nearly all the Patents
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Act of the developing countries under the impression that it is permitted under TRIPS. 182
However, using Article 27.1, the USA raised the question of presence of local working in
Brazil’s Patent Act and even when it withdrew the complaint, it was withdrawn with the
assertion that the USA would pursue the matter aggressively for the removal of local
working.
Another point of issue is that of exhaustion of right. In normal commercial transactions,
once the goods have been sold the buyer gets all the right in the goods. In case of the
TRIPS Agreement, using the presence of term ‘power to exclude others from import’ in
Article 28 has been used as a ground by Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of
America (PhRMA) to insist that buyer has no more right except what has been perceived
by the right holder. The PhRMA’s argument did not have any logical support but the
presence of importing patented products put in the market by the right holder in different
Patent Acts was taken up by the USA who alleged that such provisions violate Article 28
of TRIPS.183 In fact, such local working is permitted by the Paris ‘Convention as
incorporated in the TRIPS Agreement but the local working provisions present in the US
Patent Act Sections 204 184 and 209185 are not permitted and would be covered by Article
27.1 of the TRIPS Agreement.
From the above discussion, it appears that Franck’s ‘coherence’ or Dworkin's ‘integrity’
or ‘consistency’ are not the most appropriate words applicable to the TRIPS Agreement.
Further, requirement of coherence is that the international rules should be part of the
“underlying general principle”.
TRIPS was accepted with great reluctance by the majority of countries with the exception
of the USA and the EC as a part of the Uruguay Round and even after it was accepted,
there was great reluctance by the negotiating parties to reach an agreement. In fact, till
the USA by introducing Special 301 and using it to coerce some of the major opponents
of TRIPS into compliance, the majority of the WTO members were opposed to the
introduction of TRIPS into WTO framework as the provisions of TRIPS were antithetical
to the main issue of free trade. Patents and Copyrights were essentially trade restrictive
monopolies and only reason for their acceptance was to provide an incentive to the
inventors. 186 In fact, each and every provision in the TRIPS has a trade restrictive effect,
and longer the monopolies stay, the greater the protection. In this respect, the effect of the
TRIPS Agreement has been to distort the free trade structure erected by GATT 1994 and
its associated agreements and understandings.
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Adherence (to a Normative Hierarchy) and Community
While discussing his fourth factor of adherence, Franck identified “state equality” and
“the fundamental principle of international law that it prevails over domestic law” as
“ultimate rules of recognition”. The question of equality between nations has been partly
discussed by Dutfield 187 whose analysis of data suggest that when TRIPS emphasizes the
adequate and effective protection of intellectual property laws, it is emphasizing
something which belongs to a particularly small group of nations.
A large number of instances starting from PhRMA’s submission188, the USTR’s 189
categorization of different countries including the EC as violating the provisions of
TRIPS and the discussions at Doha Ministerial Meetings, all suggest the ‘true
community’ where the members accept that they are governed by common principles is
not applicable to the TRIPS Agreement.
Conclusion
Setear while trying to promote his view on game-theoretic approach of international law
which he called as “An Iterative Perspective”, tried to criticize Franck’s approach on the
basis that, “The legitimacy oriented perspective, therefore, suffers from difficulties in
defining the various factors said to comprise legitimacy, and it being sure that legitimacy
is in fact the desired metric at all.” 190 However, first Setear has ignored the fact that
game-theoretic approach in economics is based essentially on a large number of strict
assumptions which normally are not applicable in the real world and what Franck has
tried to do is to develop an underlying theory as to why international rules are followed in
the international relations when the nations are sovereign. There is no measure of
determinacy, validity, coherence and adherence but they are not subjective and
examination of any treaty would show that a treaty having significant presence of above
factors does attract greater compliance. The most significant example is the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties. Some of these points have been discussed by
Byers. 191
Franck’s concept of legitimacy is not based on a very sound empirical foundation and has
mostly been supported by a large number of anecdotal evidence. It is more like Michael
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Porter’s192 analysis of competitive strategy and in similar manner provides an
extraordinary powerful tool for analyzing the legitimacy of and compliance with
international treaty.
There appears to be a reluctance on the part of majority of countries both developed and
the developing to accept the provisions of the TRIPS because of the circumstances in
which it was prepared, the extraordinary role played by the interested trade associations
and the antithetical emphasis on monopolistic control against free trade.
However, greater legitimacy might by achieved by introducing suitable changes through
modifications of Articles 1.1, 27 and 33 of the TRIPS Agreement to bring predictability
and certainty. There has to be certain norms for extension of monopolies. The
extraordinary influence welded by certain industries and certain countries in the
introduction and imposition of provisions which were not even part of the existing
provisions in the domestic laws have converted TRIPS substantially into an illegitimate
treaty. The introduction of appropriate norms is required to ensure that the limited
monopolies to encourage progress of science and technical arts should not end up as a
perpetuation of monopolies in the international context. The introduction of certainty and
predictability in the TRIPS Agreement may help in bringing some form of legitimacy in
this international agreement. Alternatively the TRIPS Agreement would be nothing but a
system of continuous twisting of arms and hurling of abuses.
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